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IMPROVING JURY COMPREHENSION IN
COMPLEX CIVIL LITIGATION
COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL COURTS OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR
ASSOCIATION*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is by now commonplace that jury trials in federal civil ac-
tions have become increasingly lengthy and complex. It is by no
means rare for the duration of a trial to be measured in months
rather than weeks or days. Complexity may take many forms: legal
issues may be multiple, overlapping, and arcane; factual issues may
be highly technical or otherwise difficult to comprehend; and even
where not studded with abstruse technical evidence, a trial record
may tax a jury's powers of comprehension and assimilation simply
by its sheer size.
In a long and complicated trial, there is likely to be much evi-
dence that the jury does not understand, appreciate the signifi-
cance of, or, when the time to deliberate finally arrives, even re-
member. It is a small wonder then that judges, legal scholars, social
scientists, and even jurors themselves have begun increasingly to
question whether trial by jury is either an efficient or a fair means
of resolving highly complex litigation. Then Chief Justice Burger
sparked the debate in his August 1979 address to the Conference
of State Chief Justices,' and the debate has continued unabated
ever since. Indeed, courts have disagreed as to whether the seventh
amendment guaranty of jury trial extends to cases of such com-
plexity that a jury may be unable to discharge its functions of find-
ing the facts and applying the law thereto in an informed, rational
manner.
2
* This Article is based upon the Report drafted by the Subcommittee on Juries and
approved by the Committee on Federal Courts of the New York State Bar Association, is-
sued July 12, 1988. The Subcommittee on Juries is comprised of Michael A. Cooper, Valerie
Cohen, Melanie L. Cyganowski, Mitchell A. Lowenthal, Jonathan Miller, and Robert Wise,
Jr. The opinions contained in this Article do not constitute the official position of the New
York State Bar Association unless and until adopted by the House of Delegates.
' Burger, Can Juries Cope with Multi-Month Trials?, 3 Am. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 448
(1980).
2 Compare In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 passim (3d Cir.
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We will not join that debate. However, recognizing that juries
will continue to be called upon to decide factually and legally com-
plex cases, we believe it may be useful to summarize and discuss
some of the techniques that are available to increase the likelihood
that a jury verdict will reflect a fidelity to both the evidentiary
record and the trial judge's instructions. Those techniques can be
divided roughly into four categories: (i) ordering the issues for
trial, (ii) the conduct of the evidentiary portion of a trial, (iii) the
trial judge's final instructions, and (iv) the form of the jury verdict.
There are four distinct actors (or sets of actors) in every trial:
counsel for the parties, witnesses, the trial judge, and the jury. To
keep this Article within manageable bounds, we will focus princi-
pally on the judge and jury, although we acknowledge that counsel
and witnesses play major roles in maximizing jury comprehension
in complex and, for that matter, simple cases.
II. ORDERING THE ISSUES TO BE TRIED
Virtually every case presents a number of issues for a jury to
resolve. Thus, in the paradigm personal injury action, the jury typ-
ically must decide whether the defendant breached a statutory or
common law duty, whether that breach of duty proximately caused
injury to the plaintiff, and what money damages the plaintiff can
establish by a preponderance of the evidence. The issues may eas-
ily multiply. Thus, again using the personal injury action as a
model, the defendant may challenge the factual basis for personal
jurisdiction or plead the statute of limitations as an affirmative de-
fense; the plaintiff may be charged with contributory or compara-
tive negligence or with assumption of the risk; and the defendant
may implead a third party on a claim for contribution or indemni-
fication. Typically, these issues are all decided in a single trial, but
they need not be.
An action may be divided into separate issues or groups of is-
sues to be tried and submitted for decision sequentially rather
than contemporaneously. In civil litigation, rule 42(b) of the Fed-
1980) (right to jury trial does not necessarily apply to complex antitrust issues) with In re
United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 431 (9th Cir. 1979) ("we refuse to read a com-
plexity exception into the Seventh Amendment"), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980). Courts
are divided over the meaning and significance to be attributed to the Supreme Court's state-
ment in Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970), that "the 'legal' nature of an issue," for the
purpose of deciding whether there is a right to jury trial, is determined by considering, inter
alia, "the practical abilities and limitations of juries." Id. at 538 n.10.
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eral Rules of Civil Procedure provides ample authority for dividing
a case in this manner. Rule 42(b) authorizes a "separate trial" of a
separate "claim" or "issue," or "any number" of claims or issues,
"in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when sepa-
rate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy." The only
limitation embodied in the rule is that the right to trial by jury
shall be "preserv[ed] inviolate."3
Threshold issues such as personal or subject-matter jurisdic-
tion or venue may be tried preliminarily, as may affirmative de-
fenses such as the statute of limitations or waiver. The most com-
mon form of bifurcation has been to separate the liability phase of
a trial from the damages phase on grounds of expedition and
economization (expending time and money on proof of damages
can be obviated if a plaintiff is unable to establish liability) or
avoidance of prejudice (proof of severe injury may prejudice a de-
fendant's contention that it did not manufacture the product caus-
ing that injury). On occasion, even a single element of liability,
such as causation, may be isolated for trial.
Although considerations of economy and efficiency frequently
predominate on a motion for separate trial under rule 42(b), the
prospect of improved jury comprehension may be a significant fac-
tor. For example, issues or claims may be separately tried in patent
or antitrust cases because of the legal and/or factual complexity
which frequently characterizes such cases. Given the liberality with
which rule 18(a) permits joinder of unrelated claims between the
same parties, rule 42(b) may be employed to order separate trials
so that jurors do not become confused in trying to keep separate
their consideration of unrelated issues of fact and law.
Segregation of issues for separate trial can improve jury com-
prehension by (i) reducing the volume of evidence, arguments, and
3 FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b). In criminal prosecutions, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14
confers authority, loosely akin to the court's powers under rule 42(b) in a civil action, to
divide the trial of an indictment or information into separate segments. See FED. R CRIM. P.
14. Rule 14 authorizes a district judge to order "an election or separate trials of counts,
grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires" if neces-
sary to avoid prejudice to a defendant or the government. Id. Among the factors to be con-
sidered in deciding whether to order a severance are the complexity of the indictment or
information, the estimated length of the trial, and disparities in the alleged involvement of,
and amount of proof against, the defendants. See United States v. Gallo, 668 F. Supp. 736,
749 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). A weighing of these factors will determine whether a unitary trial will
reasonably assure that the jury decides each defendant's guilt or innocence only on the basis
of evidence admissible against that defendant. See id.
1988]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
instructions with which the jury must deal at the time, and (ii)
concentrating the presentation of evidence and thereby reducing
the interval between the time when the jury hears the evidence
and when it must assimilate that evidence in its deliberations.
However, courts should continue to invoke rule 42(b) with
caution, for separate trials can entail a price where a case is not
terminated by the first trial. Evidence and arguments may have to
be duplicated, thereby actually prolonging the case.4
Moreover, the general flavor of a case can be lost during piece-
meal consideration of its components. In the context of a mass tort
case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
noted the "danger that bifurcation may deprive plaintiffs of their
legitimate right to place before the jury the circumstances and at-
mosphere of the entire cause of action which they have brought
into the court, replacing it with a sterile or laboratory atmosphere
in which causation is parted from the reality of injury."'5 The trial
judge may guard against this risk by ordering the proof in a uni-
tary trial and submitting an issue for decision by the jury by spe-
cial verdict when the proof on that issue is complete.
Finally, it is worth recalling in connection with the delineation
of issues for trial that the "formulation and simplification of the
issues" is the very first subject enumerated in rule 16(c)" which the
court and counsel should consider at a pretrial conference.
III. CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL
Frequently a jury is given no framework other than counsel's
opening statements to assist it in comprehending, evaluating, and
remembering evidence as it is received into the record day after
day, week after week, during a lengthy trial. Normally only at the
end of the trial is the jury instructed as to its role and the rules of
law which it must apply to the evidentiary record. Is this a satis-
factory state of affairs? Or, as Judge Prettyman put the question
It has been determined empirically that when liability and damages are bifurcated
and liability is found, juries take longer in the aggregate to deliberate on liability and dam-
ages separately than they do when those issues are tried jointly. See Zeisel & Callahan, Split
Trials and Time Saving: A Statistical Analysis, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1621 (1963). The
authors of the Harvard article did conclude, however, that overall, the general use of bifur-
cated trials results in a time savings because frequently the jury avoids deliberating dam-
ages. See id.
' In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 695 F.2d 207, 217 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S.
929 (1983).
" See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c).
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(and provided the answer):
What manner of mind can go back over a stream of conflicting
statements of alleged facts, recall the intonations, the demeanor,
or even the existence of the witnesses, and retrospectively fit all
these recollections into a pattern of evaluation and judgment
given him for the first time after the events? The human mind
cannot do so.7
Fortunately, there is a growing realization that a jury need not
be left to its own devices throughout a trial and that there are a
number of techniques available to provide guidance, enhance com-
prehension, and improve memory. We now review a number of
those techniques.
A. Preliminary Instructions
Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure calls for the
trial judge to instruct the jury at the close of the evidence., But by
then, as various empirical studies have demonstrated, 9 many jurors
have already reached more or less tentative decisions, and are in
effect being told to reconsider views already formulated. Prelimi-
nary instructions, delivered before the first witness is called or the
initial exhibit received, can reduce the tendency to reach prema-
ture judgments and otherwise lead to more informed verdicts.
The delivery of preliminary instructions was included in a se-
ries of experiments conducted during 1983 and 1984 by district
judges in the Second Circuit under the supervision of the Commit-
tee on Juries of the Circuit's Judicial Council. The Committee's
report noted four possible advantages of pre-instruction: (i) en-
hancement of the jury's ability to remember evidence, resulting
from the observed phenomenon that attention and memory are
more acute when an individual understands what he or she is look-
ing for; (ii) improving a jury's ability to assimilate evidence and
relate it to the relevant issues by providing a table of contents for
the trial; (iii) helping jurors to identify and, it is hoped, thereby
resist prejudices they may bring with them to the courtroom; and
(iv) assisting the jury in evaluating credibility and drawing reason-
able inferences by providing guidance on these subjects before, not
Prettyman, Jury Instructions-First or Last?, 46 A.BA. J. 1066, 1066 (1960).
8 FED. R. Civ. P. 51.
1 See I. HOROWITZ & T. WILLGING, THE PSYCHIATRY OF LAW, INTEGRATIONS AND APPLICA-
TIONS 189 (1984).
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only after, the jurors are required to perform these tasks.1"
Although the Second Circuit pre-instruction experiment was
of limited scope (three judges and a total of fourteen trials), a ma-
jority of participating judges and counsel favored the procedure. In
a broader study conducted in Wisconsin, the judges and attorneys
similarly favored the procedure; judges who delivered preliminary
instructions reported a greater measure of satisfaction with the
jury's verdict than those who did not." Moreover, pre-instructed
jurors were significantly more satisfied with the conduct of the trial
in a number of respects than jurors not given preliminary instruc-
tions; the former found preliminary instructions decidedly helpful
in remembering, evaluating, and organizing the evidence, under-
standing the law, and applying the law to the facts. 2
We have recently conducted a survey of the Bar in New York
State on various aspects of federal court practice, including the de-
sirability of preliminary instructions. Of the 1,209 attorneys ex-
pressing views on this subject, seventy-three percent favored pre-
instruction of the jury and only eighteen percent disagreed.'3
There appears to be no persuasive reason why preliminary in-
structions on procedural matters, such as the respective roles of
the trial judge, counsel, and the jury, should not be given in every
case. Indeed, pre-instruction on substantive matters, although it
may be equally helpful, requires greater effort on the part of both
court and counsel (including, ideally, a charging conference) and
runs the risk of oversimplifying the issues to be tried. However, the
advantages of pre-instruction noted above may outweigh these
concerns.
B. Interim Instructions, Commentary, and Summations
Direct communication with the jury by counsel has tradition-
ally been limited to opening statements at the outset of the case
and summations at its close. Likewise, substantive instructions to
'0 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON JURIES 42-43
(Aug. 1984) [hereinafter 1984 SECOND CIRCUIT REPORT].
"' COMMITTEE ON IMPROVING JURY COMMUNICATIONS, WISCONSIN JUDICIAL COUNCIL,
DRAFT FINAL REPORT 17-18 (May 1985) [hereinafter WISCONSIN REPORT].
12 Id. at 16-17. A number of Ninth Circuit jurors surveyed in 1986 also suggested that
pre-instruction would be helpful. SURVEY OF JUROR ATTITUDES, NINTH CIRCUIT JUDICIAL
COUNCIL, FINAL REPORT 7 (1986) [hereinafter NINTH CIRCUIT REPORT]. "That way," one juror
said, "we would have a much better idea what to look for during a trial." Id.
" N.Y. ST. B.A. SURVEY OF THE BAR 45 (June 29, 1988) [hereinafter 1988 NYSBA
SURVEY].
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the jury by the court traditionally have come only at the end of the
trial and, to some extent more recently, at its beginning. During
the span of time between these two points, which in a lengthy trial
may last several weeks or months, typically neither counsel nor the
court communicates directly with the jurors about the significance
of the evidence unfolding before them. As a result, the jury is often
at a loss to understand how the evidence relates to the issues in
the case or what principles of law govern its significance. This dis-
advantage may be removed by having the trial judge or counsel, or
both, address the jury intermittently during the trial, thus provid-
ing the jurors with opportunities over the course of a lengthy trial
to hear explanations, both partial and impartial, of complicated ev-
idence and legal principles.
For example, at logical breaks in the flow of testimony, the
trial judge might review and summarize the evidence, explain the
legal issues, or instruct (or reinstruct) the jury on applicable legal
principles. Another method the trial judge might employ would be
to allow counsel to periodically address the jury to sum up, provide
an' introduction for new evidence, offer explanations of evidence
that has been introduced, or pose questions for the jury to
consider.
Both techniques address the same problem: the absence of op-
portunity over a long period of time for the jury to hear explana-
tions of complicated evidence or legal principles. While neither
technique has received much use in protracted cases, each offers
the possibility of significant benefits in improved juror comprehen-
sion and memory.
1. Interim Instructions and Evidentiary Summaries by the Court
In a lengthy trial, there are several advantages to be gained
from the practice of having the trial judge give interim instructions
to the jury or periodically review and summarize the evidence, or
do both.14
First, interim instructions and evidentiary summaries may en-
hance the jury's ability to remember the evidence presented at
trial, since a juror's attention and memory is sharper when that
juror first understands what he or she is looking for and when evi-
14 A comprehensive discussion of judicial commentary on evidence may be found in
Weinstein, The Power and Duty of Federal Judges to Marshall and Comment on the Evi-
dence in Jury Trials and Some Suggestions on Charging Juries, 118 F.R.D. 161 (1988).
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dence, once presented, is then periodically reviewed. Second, by
serving as a sort of continually updated roadmap of the issues in
the case, interim instructions may increase the jury's ability to or-
ganize and assimilate evidence and, ultimately, to connect that evi-
dence to the legal issues on which it bears. Third, periodic reviews
of the evidence may keep fresh in the jurors' minds previously in-
troduced information which is crucial to the jury's ability to com-
prehend the meaning or assess the significance of evidence that
will be presented weeks or months later. Fourth, interim instruc-
tions on matters of procedure (e.g., presumptions, the nature of
reasonable inferences, or the evaluation of credibility), when timely
given, should put such procedural concepts in context and allow
jurors to appreciate their significance while perceiving the events
of trial to which they may relate, rather than retroactively during
deliberation. Fifth, interim instructions, when targeted to discrete
issues as they are presented during trial, may be better understood
and more effectively applied by the jury than when they are buried
in an omnibus charge at the close of trial.
On the other hand, there also appear to be several potential
disadvantages to a trial judge's use of interim instructions and evi-
dentiary summaries in a lengthy trial. It is possible that whatever
tendencies jurors may have to decide on the outcome of a case
early in the trial will be compounded by any instructions or com-
ments on the evidence given before the presentation of all of the
evidence is complete. 5 Additionally, both interim instructions and
evidentiary summaries may have the effect of focusing all members
of the jury on the same evidence and legal issues. To the extent
that the deliberative process is enriched by a diversity of motiva-
tions, memories, viewpoints, attitudes, and sensitivities, this pro-
cess may be diminished by the uniformity that interim commen-
tary by the court might encourage. Finally, if interim instructions
and summaries are more abbreviated than any initial pre-instruc-
tion or the closing charge and marshalling of the evidence, they
may result in an oversimplification of the issues being tried.
" A variety of social science studies suggest that individuals have a persistent tendency
to reason in a confirmatory manner once they have been provided with or settled on a spe-
cific hypothesis. See, e.g., P. WASON, PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING; STRUCTURE AND CONTENT
(1972); Snyder, Hypothesis-testing Processes In Social Interaction, 36 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 1202-12 (1978).
[Vol. 62:549
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2. Interim Summations by Counsel
Allowing counsel to make interim summations to the jury was
first given prominence, if not first utilized, in the highly publicized
libel trial of Westmoreland v. CBS. In that case, which occupied
sixty-two trial days over a five-month period before a settlement
was reached, each side was allowed up to a total of 120 minutes for
interim summations between the opening and closing arguments;
the trial judge, Honorable Pierre N. Leval, permitted counsel to
speak directly to the jury as the case was being conducted. Counsel
could use their time whenever and however they saw fit-in blocks
of time as short or as long as counsel felt necessary to accomplish
the point they were attempting to make.'"
During the case, counsel gave interim summations eighty-four
times (plaintiff's counsel used the device forty-three times). The
longest of these summations lasted about ten minutes, and the
shortest ran only about seventy to ninety seconds; on average, they
took less than two and a half minutes. Counsel used interim sum-
mations at different times for different purposes. Their most fre-
quent use appears to have been at the start or finish of a witness'
direct or cross-examination. Occasionally, however, the examining
counsel would stop to address the jury midway through his exami-
nation or upon receipt in evidence of a document or item of de-
monstrative evidence. While the use of interim summations typi-
cally instigated a responsive summation by the opposing counsel, it
did not always do so.
Other than in Westmoreland, the technique of allowing in-
terim summations by counsel seems to have been little used. The
advantages, however, of employing such summations, particularly
in a protracted and complex case, may be significant in terms of
increasing juror comprehension and recall.
Interim summations enable counsel to break up otherwise
massive presentations of evidence, clarify key points for the jury,
put the evidence they have just heard in context, explain the sig-
nificance of their proof or the opposing party's proof, and comment
on its strength or weakness. In a lengthy trial, where the elements
of various claims or defenses are built up bit by bit through the
16 The only restriction the court imposed was that an attorney could not use an interim
summation unduly to interfere with his adversary's presentation of evidence or with the
court's schedule. See Leval, From The Bench: Westmoreland v. CBS, LITIGATION, Fall 1985,
at 7-8, 66-67.
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testimony of numerous witnesses and exhibits over the course of
weeks or months, allowing counsel periodically to pull together
otherwise unconnected pieces of evidence may substantially im-
prove the jury's understanding.
Moreover, interim summations may keep the jury's attention
focused on the evidence. All lawyers have witnessed jurors tune out
the presentation of evidence where, for example, the witness' voice
is monotone or deposition transcripts are being read. Allowing
counsel periodically to address the jury affords counsel the oppor-
tunity to bring the jury back into what is going on in the court-
room. Finally, an interim summation affords counsel the chance to
keep the jurors' minds open while the other side is presenting its
case by illuminating both confirmatory and contradictory evidence
and explaining its significance.
On the other hand, there are possible pitfalls to allowing coun-
sel to address the jury during the presentation of the evidence.
There is a risk that in reaching its decision the jury will focus on
what counsel say the case is about, rather than on what is actually
shown by the evidence presented. It is plausible, for example, that
some jurors might feel that they do not have to concentrate on the
testimony or exhibits because one of the lawyers will explain the
meaning of the evidence either immediately before or following its
introduction. Further, in the absence of tight control by the court,
the practice may be subject to abuse by some lawyers who will mis-
use any opportunity to address the jury if they can get away with
it.
C. Note-taking and Questions by Jurors
Jurors generally are viewed, or at least treated, as passive par-
ticipants in a trial. Lawyers and, on occasion, judges question wit-
nesses; jurors normally do not. Lawyers and judges take notes to
facilitate their recollection of evidence and record their impres-
sions of its significance; jurors normally do not. An observer unfa-
miliar with the American legal system might fairly ask why we im-
pose these handicaps on the trial participant with the weightiest
role, that of reaching a decision. Neither reason nor experience re-
quires that we do so.
[Vol. 62:549
IMPROVING JURY COMPREHENSION
1. Juror Note-taking
Unlike certain state judicial systems,'17 there is no federal stat-
ute or rule governing the subject of note-taking by juries, and the
determination as to whether or not to allow such note-taking is left
to the sound discretion of the trial judge. 8
The asserted advantages of juror note-taking are premised on
the fairly straightforward belief that jurors are more likely to un-
derstand and remember what they both see and hear, not just hear
alone. From this premise, it follows that note-taking is likely to be
a valuable aid in increasing jurors' attentiveness, helping them fo-
cus more logically and clearly on important issues, and refreshing
memory. It is not surprising that jurors themselves are in favor of
note-taking.19
Critics of juror note-taking contend that there is an undue risk
that jurors intent upon taking notes may miss important testimony
and/or be distracted from focusing their attention on the demeanor
of a witness, that jurors will attach too much significance to notes
and too little to their independent recollections, and that the most
assiduous note-takers may dominate the jury. To guard against
-these risks, trial judges commonly instruct juries, when note-taking
is permitted, that (i) the notes are to be used only as an aid to a
juror's memory and are not to be accorded precedence over the
juror's independent recollection of the facts; (ii) jurors should not
be influenced by other jurors' notes; and (iii) jurors should not al-
low note-taking to become more important than, or to distract
them from, the trial proceedings.
Empirical studies have tended to confirm that the advantages
of note-taking outweigh the disadvantages, and a majority of attor-
neys appear to favor the practice.2" Thus, it has been observed that
jurors permitted to take notes request less frequently that portions
of the transcript be read during their deliberations, and such jurors
" See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 78, para. 36(b) (1987) (entitling a petit juror in any
Illinois court to take notes); Wis. STAT. §§ 805.13(2)(a), 972.10(1)(a) (Supp. 1987-1988) (ju-
rors entitled to take notes unless the trial judge states on record reasons for prohibiting
note-taking).
"8 See, e.g., United States v. Polowichak, 783 F.2d 410, 413 (4th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Bertolotti, 529 F.2d 149, 159-60 (2d Cir. 1975).
19 Eighty-one percent of the jurors in the Ninth Circuit survey supported, with fifty-six
percent "strongly" supporting, juror note-taking. NINTH CIRCUIT REPORT, supra note 12, at
9, 11; see J. CECIL, E. LIND & G. BERMANT, JURY SERVICE IN LENGTHY CIVIL TRIALS 29 (1987).
20 See 1984 SECOND CIRCUIT REPORT, supra note 10, at 71; WISCONSIN REPORT, supra
note 11, at 22-23.
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are better able to pinpoint which sections of the transcript they
wish to have read to them. 21 Significantly, jurors in note-taking tri-
als reported that note-takers did not exercise more influence than
non-note-takers.22
A recent survey of the New York Bar produced some interest-
ing data on this subject. Antitrust and bankruptcy lawyers favored
juror note-taking; personal injury lawyers did not. Moreover, the
more trials to verdict in which a lawyer had participated, the less
likely it was that he or she approved of the practice.23
2. Questions by Jurors
Of the array of jury comprehension techniques currently in
use, permitting questions by jurors may be the least frequently em-
ployed. Thus, in a study conducted by the Wisconsin Judicial
Council, participating judges had used the technique in only one
percent of their previous trials, and most of the participating attor-
neys had never before tried a case where jurors were permitted to
formulate questions for the witnesses.24
Proponents of permitting questions by jurors point out that it
permits jurors to actively participate in a trial, thereby causing
them to be more attentive throughout; that counsel can employ ju-
rors' questions as "feedback" on how the trial is progressing, per-
mitting counsel to focus their attention on particular concerns or
confusion manifested by juror questions; and that the device pro-
vides a "check" on counsel, promoting the thorough questioning of
witnesses and assuring that information is elicited which the jurors
believe is necessary to reach an informed verdict.
Critics of questioning by jurors counter that the procedure can
take up a good deal of time; that jurors, who are not familiar with
the rules of evidence, will often bring up irrelevant, improper, or
excluded subjects in their questions; that the procedure can be
generally disruptive of the orderly conduct of a trial; that juror
questions can undermine the adversary process by interfering un-
duly with counsel's trial strategy; and that jurors may employ
questioning as a vehicle for expressing preconceived views.
Clearly, questioning by jurors, if permitted at all, must be sub-
21 1984 SECOND CIRCUIT REPORT, supra note 10, at 69.
22 WISCONSIN REPORT, supra note 11, at 21.
23 1988 NYSBA SURVEY, supra note 13, at 43.
24 WISCONSIN REPORT, supra note 11, at 9-11.
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ject to tight controls. Trial judges who permit such questioning
generally instruct jurors that they will be permitted to pose ques-
tions only at the conclusion of both the direct and cross-examina-
tion of any particular witness, and that questions must be submit-
ted in writing so that their propriety may be reviewed by the court
and counsel out of the jury's presence.25
As for experiential satisfaction with juror questioning, the em-
pirical data is scant and somewhat conflicting. Jurors, perhaps not
surprisingly, generally favor the technique, even though most do
not accept the invitation to pose questions. Trial judges tend to be
divided on the issue: those who favor the technique emphasize
cases where insightful jurors have asked an overlooked question,
while those opposed focus on the delay caused by having to stop a
trial, review a question out of the jurors' presence, and take argu-
ments on its appropriateness. Attorneys seem more often than not
to be opposed to the technique,2 believing that its "feedback"
benefits are outweighed by its disruption of what counsel have his-
torically considered solely within their province: controlling the or-
der of proof at trial and the manner in which their respective cases
are presented.
IV. THE FINAL CHARGE TO THE JURY
Having discussed various techniques for improving jury com-
prehension, recall, and assimilation of evidence that may be em-
ployed before and during a trial, we turn to the final charge to the
jury. At this juncture, the jurors are told (or reminded, if the court
has given preliminary or interim instructions) that they alone are
the exclusive judges of the facts and that, upon being instructed as
to the law, they are to render their verdict by applying those in-
structions to the facts they find.
One may reasonably question whether jurors can accomplish
this task when presented with instructions that, in Judge Bok's
25 It is submitted that the court should further instruct that questions should be factual
and not reflect sympathy with a party's position, that a refusal to ask a particular question
should not be held against a party, and that there are a number of reasons why a question
may be considered inappropriate, including not only rules of evidence but also the possibil-
ity that a later witness will be called to testify upon the subject matter raised by the partic-
ular question.
" In this Committee's recent survey of the New York Bar, 616 responding attorneys
(forty-nine percent) disapproved of questioning by jurors, while 508 attorneys (forty-one
percent) favored the practice. 1988 NYSBA SURVEY, supra note 13, at 40. A higher percent-
age of the more experienced trial lawyers disapproved of the practice. Id.
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words, often douse them "with a kettleful of law ... that would
make a third-year law student blanch. '27 Too often both lawyers
and judges bypass the opportunity to teach jurors and increase
jury comprehension by providing clearer instruction in under-
standable terms and offering specific guidance as to how various
items of evidence received throughout the lengthy trial may be re-
lated and assessed.
A. Preparation of Instructions
Concerned that the unwillingness of American judges to com-
ment on the evidence "often dilutes the jury instruction to incom-
prehensible boilerplate,"2 s former Chief Judge Weinstein of the
Eastern District of New York has urged that the jury charge be
viewed "as an opportunity to educate the jurors as we would want
ourselves educated if we were in their position. '29 Judge Weinstein
has suggested: (i) avoiding unnecessary use of legalistic terminol-
ogy, relying instead upon "basic English" with instructions, to the
extent possible, in clear and simple terms; and (ii) having the trial
judge both summarize and comment upon the evidence, offering
the jury specific guidance in evaluating witnesses' credibility and
marshalling the evidence in some sort of organized fashion. °
One specific technique for improving the comprehensibility of
the jury charge-and reducing the risk of reversible error-is for
trial judges to write out their proposed instructions in advance,
distribute copies to opposing counsel, and permit counsel to com-
ment specifically on them at a charging conference.31 While this
practice appears more the exception than the rule, it clearly en-
hances the opportunity for both counsel and court to ensure that
the charge presents an accurate exposition of the law as it applies
to the case at hand. Moreover, to the extent that the trial judge
chooses to comment upon the evidence, written instructions pro-
vide counsel with the opportunity to review whether the court's
comments are balanced and do not favor one party.
27 C. BOK, I, TOo, NICODEMUS (1946), quoted in Weinstein, supra note 14, at 166.
28 Weinstein, supra note 14, at 162.
29 Id. at 166.
Id. at 170, 174-76.
Id. at 170.
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B. Timing: When Should the Court Deliver its Final Instruc-
tions to the Jury?
Prior to being amended in 1987, rule 51 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure required that the court instruct the jury after
the completion of closing arguments by counsel.2 Rule 51, as
amended, now affords greater flexibility: "The court, at its election,
may instruct the jury before or after argument, or both.""3
The accompanying Notes of the Advisory Committee explain
the benefits that may be realized by having the court instruct the
jury before closing arguments:
[I]t gives counsel the opportunity to explain the instructions, ar-
gue their application to the facts and thereby give the jury the
maximum assistance in determining the issues and arriving at a
good verdict on the law and the evidence .... Moreover, if the
court instructs before an argument, counsel then know the precise
words the court has chosen and need not speculate as to the
words the court will later use in its instructions. 4
Perhaps because less than one year has passed since the
amendment to rule 51, the great majority of judges in the Southern
and Eastern Districts of New York continue the longstanding fed-
eral tradition of instructing the jury after counsel have completed
their closing arguments. However, even in other jurisdictions where
courts have long had discretion to determine the timing of deliver-
ing instructions, the practice of delivering instructions after attor-
neys' closing arguments appears to be favored. For example, sixty
percent of trial court judges surveyed in Wisconsin usually deliv-
ered instructions to the jury after the completion of summations.3 5
3' J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE RULES PAMPHLET, PART I 562-63 (1988).
13 FED. R. CIv. P. 51.
11 FED. R. Civ. P. 51 advisory committee's note. The Advisory Committee also com-
mented that jurors are more likely to be "fresh" and consequently more attentive to instruc-
tions delivered prior to closing arguments. Id. While this may often be so, former Chief
Judge Weinstein has contrasted his personal experience:
[S]o long as the jurors are given a short break following closing arguments, they
are likely to be eager to pay attention to the neutral arguments of the judge after
having been surfeited with lawyers' arguments tailored to meet their clients'
needs.
Weinstein, supra note 14, at 171 n.30.
"' WISCONSIN REPORT, supra note 11, at 2.
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C. Providing Typewritten Instructions to the Jury
Jurors clearly favor the provision of written instructions for
their use during deliberations. They view written instructions as
affording substantial benefit in understanding the trial and in-
creasing the likelihood that their verdict will be "based upon a
complete and proper understanding of the judge's instructions. "36
Members of the Bar tend to agree. In this Committee's recent
survey, more than seventy percent of the responding New York
lawyers agreed that jurors in civil trials should be permitted to re-
view the written charge during deliberations.3 7 The response of
lawyers surveyed in Wisconsin was similarly positive, although the
provision of written instructions to the jury did not influence these
same attorneys' satisfaction with the trial."
In sharp contrast to the views held by lawyers and jurors, how-
ever, the response from the Bench appears far less enthusiastic.
Thus, while twelve of the fourteen judges who participated in the
Second Circuit experiment in which jurors were furnished written
copies of the charge after its delivery initially responded positively,
only one judge continued to use this method two years later-and
did so rarely.39
Among the concerns voiced by the judges were the following:
(i) providing written instructions to jurors encouraged them to "in-
terpret the law on their own" and thus discouraged them from
seeking further guidance from the court, including making addi-
tional requests for clarifying instructions; (ii) the seemingly simple
logistics of preparing written instructions were in fact a
"nightmare," time consuming and very taxing upon the court's
limited staff resources; (iii) especially when written instructions
were given to jurors during delivery of the charge, judges felt un-
necessarily restrained from extemporizing or in any way departing
from the text; and (iv) even when instructed not to do so, jurors
may nonetheless overemphasize one portion of the charge to the
exclusion of the others.40
36 Id. at 26; see NINTH CIRCUIT REPORT, supra note 12, at 9; J. CECIL, E. LIND & G.
BERMANT, supra note 19, at 4.
1988 NYSBA SURVEY, supra note 13, at 44.
" WISCONSIN REPORT, supra note 11, at 27.
111984 SECOND CIRCUIT REPORT, supra note 10, at 78-79; COMMITTEE ON JURIES OF THE
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT, FOLLOW-UP SURVEY REPORT 10 (Apr. 1986) [here-
inafter 1986 SECOND CIRCUIT FOLLOW-UP REPORT].
40 1984 SECOND CIRCUIT REPORT, supra note 10, at 80-83.
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On the other hand, potential benefits cited by the responding
judges included a saving of court time (avoiding having to bring
the jury back from the jury room for a clarifying instruction) and
the facilitation of better understanding and retention by the jurors
of the court's instructions. The latter benefits were thought partic-
ularly helpful in a longer or more complex trial.4
D. Providing a Tape Recording of the Instructions to the Jury
The overall response toward tape-recording of the trial judge's
instructions for use during jury deliberations is far more guarded
from the perspective of both the Bench and the Bar.4" In contrast
to the favored use of providing written instructions to jurors for
use during deliberations, only a fairly slim plurality (forty-one per-
cent to thirty-four percent) of the lawyers surveyed recently by
this Committee expressed the opinion that judges should tape-rec-
ord their live jury instructions for later replay by jurors upon their
request.43
Similarly, although the judges participating in the Second Cir-
cuit experiment providing a tape recording of the court's charge to
the jurors initially responded that it was "very helpful," none were
using the procedure two years later.44
V. FORMS OF VERDICTS
Rule 49 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth
three broad forms of verdict that may be submitted to a jury in a
civil case: special verdicts, general verdicts, and general verdicts
with interrogatories. 5 While general verdicts are the most popular
form of civil jury verdict, the trial court has virtually unfettered
discretion to submit either special verdicts or a general verdict
with interrogatories. 6 Choosing among these alternatives is not
41 Id.
42 Although some jurors in the Ninth Circuit study independently suggested that the
judge's instructions should be videotaped for later replay during deliberations, see NINTH
CIRCUIT REPORT, supra note 12, at 7, we are not aware of any survey of the actual use of this
device.
1988 NYSBA SuRvEY, supra note 13, at 44.
" 1984 SECOND CIRCUIT REPORT, supra note 10, at 86; 1986 SECOND CIRCUIT FOLLOW-UP
REPORT, supra note 39, at 11.
11 FED. R. Civ. P. 49. The form of verdict presented to jurors in criminal cases raises
issues not addressed here. See generally United States v. Coonan, 839 F.2d 886 (2d Cir.
1988) (use of special verdicts and interrogatories in RICO prosecution).
46 Commentators report that a verdict has never been reversed on the ground that the
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subject to scientific precision; each has desirable and undesirable
features.
A. Special Verdicts
Special verdicts under rule 49(a) may take many forms, but
are designed to limit the jury's function to resolving disputed is-
sues of fact (or mixed questions of fact and law). In essence, once
the jury responds to a series of questions relating to the material
issues in the case, the trial court is then left to apply the law to the
jury's findings.
There are two critical aspects of special verdicts. First, the fac-
tual questions submitted for the jury's resolution normally must be
in a form that will permit clear and unambiguous answers, for the
rule explicitly provides for "questions susceptible of categorical or
other brief answer. 4 7 To preserve flexibility, the rule also empow-
ers the trial judge to employ "such other method of submitting the
issues and requiring the written findings thereon as it deems most
appropriate. '48 However, questions that call for anything other
than categorical responses undermine the utility of special verdicts
because they invite ambiguity and dispute over their meaning.
Second, the questions submitted must be sufficient to address
all the material issues in dispute. While the jury is presumed to
have addressed all such issues when rendering a general verdict,
use of a special verdict provides a clear road map for identifying
those issues the jury considered and any which it failed to con-
sider. In the event a material factual issue is not presented to the
jury, the parties are given the right to cure the omission, so long as
they make prompt demand before the jury has retired. By failing
to do so, the parties waive the right to trial by jury on those
issues.49
Use of special verdicts affects the scope of the trial judge's
charge to the jury. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49(a) requires
the judge to "give to the jury such explanation and instruction
concerning the matter thus submitted as may be necessary to en-
court's use of a particular form of verdict was error. 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2505, at 493 (1971 & Supp. 1987).
47 FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a).
48 Id.
" See id. Rule 49(a) further provides that "[a]s to an issue omitted without such de-
mand the court may make a finding; or, if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed to have made a
finding in accord with the judgment on the special verdict." Id.
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able the jury to make its findings upon each issue. '5 0 The rule thus
appears to permit the judge to omit any discussion of the legal
consequences to the parties resulting from the jury's answers to
particular questions. Indeed, some courts have suggested that ad-
vising the jury of the legal ramifications of their factual determina-
tions is reversible error. In Thedorf v. Lipsey,5' for example, the
trial judge dismissed an automobile accident case on the basis of a
relevant comparative negligence law because in a special verdict
the jury found that both sides were equally at fault.52 On his ap-
peal, the plaintiff claimed the trial judge's failure to advise the jury
of the effect of the comparative negligence law was reversible er-
ror.5 3 In dictum, a unanimous Seventh Circuit strongly disagreed:
"[I]t was not within the province of the jury to consider or deter-
mine the legal result of their special findings of fact. That was a
question solely for the court. ' 54 Also in dictum, Judge Jerome
Frank was even more adamant in Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad:55
When using a special verdict, the judge need not-should
not-give any charge about the substantive legal rules beyond
what is reasonably necessary to enable the jury to answer intelli-
gently the questions put to them. As, accordingly, the jury is less
able to know whether its findings will favor one side or the other,
the appeal to the jurors' cruder prejudices will frequently be less
effective. "A perverse verdict may still be returned, granted a jury
clever enough to appreciate the effect of its answers, and to shape
them to harmonize with its general conclusions. But it is much
more difficult... and by requiring the jury to return the naked
facts only we may fairly expect to escape the results of sympathy,
prejudice and passion."'56
This view, however, is not universally held. Indeed, some mod-
ern commentators argue strongly that "the preferable rule" is to
give the jury a general charge so that jurors will know the legal
effect of their answers.57 They argue, first, that inevitably the ju-
O Id.
237 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1956).
Id. at 192.
53 Id.
' Id. at 193.
167 F.2d 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 816 (1948).
Id. at 66 (footnote omitted) (quoting CLEMENSTON, SPECIAL VERDICTS AND SPECIAL
FINDINGS BY JURIES 12 (1905)).
17 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MMLER, supra note 46, § 2509, at 513.
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rors have some idea of the consequences to the parties of their an-
swers. "If plaintiff's counsel argues eloquently that there is no evi-
dence of contributory negligence, even a juror unfamiliar with that
legal doctrine is likely to deduce that it will be in the plaintiff's
interest for him to answer 'No' to the question asking about con-
tributory negligence." 58 Worse, there is a danger that the jury will
guess incorrectly about the law and shape their answers in a wholly
59improper fashion.
A second argument raised by the commentators, and some ju-
rists, goes directly to the role of juries in dispensing justice. They
argue that attempting to shield jurors from the legal consequences
of factual determinations undermines a fundamental role juries
play: permitting the tempering of "strict rules of law by the de-
mands and necessities of substantial justice."60 Indeed, for this rea-
son Justices Black and Douglas urged that rule 49 be repealed."
The use of special verdicts avoids many of the difficulties of
explaining to lay jurors the intricacies of legal doctrine. Even
where jurors are aware of the consequences to the parties of their
answers, either through direct instruction from the court or intui-
tion, special verdicts can assist in correcting errors of law on ap-
peal. Assuming the jurors' answers are adequately supported by
the evidence, legal errors committed by the trial court in entering
judgment can usually be rectified without need for a new trial. The
virtues of special verdicts are so widely perceived that a majority
of attorneys recently surveyed by this Committee agreed that a
trial judge should usually employ a special verdict form even where
all parties are opposed to its use.2
B. General Verdicts and General Verdicts with Interrogatories
At the opposite pole from special verdicts are general verdicts,
the most common form of civil jury verdict in the United States.
Id. at 512-13.
'9 Id. at 513; see, e.g., Porche v. Gulf Miss. Marine Corp., 390 F. Supp. 624, 632 (E.D.
La. 1975) ("the better view is that a jury is entitled to know what effect its decision will
have. The jury is not to be set loose in a maze of factual questions, to be answered without
intelligent awareness of the consequences.") (citations omitted).
60 Wright, The Use of Special Verdicts in Federal Court, 38 F.R.D. 199, 201 & n.13
(1966).
1 See 374 U.S. 865, 867-68 (1963) (statement accompanying 1963 amendments to Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure).
82 1988 NYSBA SURvEY, supra note 13, at 42-43. A substantial majority (seventy-nine
percent) favored the use of special verdicts, if requested by any party. Id. at 43.
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Rather than answering specific factual questions, jurors return
generalized verdicts on the ultimate issues in the case. The court is
therefore required to instruct the jury on all applicable legal prin-
ciples, and the jury is left to find the facts and apply them to the
law as instructed by the court.
General verdicts with interrogatories, as permitted by rule
49(b), lie somewhere in between. They highlight particular issues
for the jury's attention, but still require jurors to render general
verdicts. Since the jury is expected to render a general verdict, the
court's instructions on the law are broad, and the jurors are aware
of the legal consequences to the parties of particular conclusions.
Focusing the jurors' attention on particular issues has several
beneficial consequences. The jury's deliberations can be directed
by the court to the key issues in an action and the interrogatory
answers may ease appellate review, avoid the need for new trials,
or at least narrow their scope.
By adopting features of special and general verdicts, however,
the use of general verdicts with interrogatories opens the door to
inconsistent answers that alone may exacerbate litigation. Rule
49(b) itself envisions three permutations:
When the general verdict and the answers are harmonious, the
appropriate judgment upon the verdict and answers shall be en-
tered pursuant to Rule 58. When the answers are consistent with
each other but one or more is inconsistent with the general ver-
dict, judgment may be entered pursuant to Rule 58 in accordance
with the answers, notwithstanding the general verdict, or the
court may return the jury for further consideration of its answers
and verdict or may order a new trial. When the answers are in-
consistent with each other and one or more is likewise inconsis-
tent with the general verdict, judgment shall not be entered, but
the court shall return the jury for further consideration of its an-
swers and verdict or shall order a new trial.6 3
Identifying and resolving these potential conflicts has engendered
a good deal of litigation, undermining the utility of rule 49(b) gen-
eral verdicts with interrogatories and suggesting that this form of
verdict injects confusion into the jury deliberation process. One
judge has gone so far as to argue that rule 49(b) verdicts offer
"nothing but trouble."6 4
13 FED. R. Civ. P. 49(b).
" Brovm, Federal Special Verdicts: The Doubt Eliminator, 44 F.R.D. 338, 339-40
(1968); see Weymouth v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 367 F.2d 84, 93 n.31 (5th Cir. 1966)
(Brown, J.).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The challenges of a complex civil jury trial are daunting but
not necessarily insurmountable. Various techniques are available
to aid jurors in performing their tasks of recalling and assimilating
the evidence, comprehending the trial judge's instructions, and
reaching a verdict that rationally applies those instructions to the
facts found by the jury. These techniques range from bifurcation
before trial to choice of the most appropriate form of verdict at the
end of a trial. Not all of these techniques will be helpful in every
case, but counsel and the trial judge should consider whether at
least some of them hold the promise of increasing the likelihood of
achieving the result sought in every trial: an informed, impartial,
and just verdict.
